I was recently reminded of the story from the 1980s or 1990s where a software company started paying its programmers to find and fix bugs.  If I recall the story properly, the incentive program was halted rather quickly (within a week or two) after at least one programmer received a hefty bonus through purposefully creating and finding extra bugs. 

In an incident closer to home for me, I worked with a dotcom retailer that incented its merchandisers by the number of new suppliers that were brought on – not by the profitability of those relationships.  This led to infamous deals like one with a man that sold small numbers of Beanie Babies from his garage.  The dotcom merchandiser proceeded to purchase full page ads in USA Today and several newspapers in the largest US cities to sell the Beanie Babies at fantastic prices.  Unfortunately the “supplier” had about 300 Beanie Babies “in stock” and those were sold out in about an hour’s time, however the products weren’t put in an out-of-stock state on the web site for some time after that, thus disappointing many, many customers and forcing the company to find much more expensive suppliers to fulfill as many orders as possible – at a loss to the dotcom.

A more strategic impact of that merchandiser incentive program was the fact that legitimate supplier relationships were negatively impacted as well.  It would take weeks to get fully automated relationships set up with suppliers (such as the biggest brand name computer manufacturers), and just as we got our supply chain ready for significant volumes of transactions, the merchandisers would strike a deal with a competing supplier – thus earning a bonus for the merchandisers, weeks of manual transaction management for the supplier management team, and significant efforts for the supplier.  Meanwhile, the fully automated supplier was left with no promotions and limited orders, since there was no further compensation coming to the merchandiser.   And the EDI team was left to implement a new trading partner with the company seeing little value come from their efforts to implement the previous supplier.  This was an ongoing issue.

But what, you may ask, prompted me to think of these things?  Well, I’m familiar with suppliers that have compliance departments whose leaders wish to grow little fiefdoms.  They don’t want to eliminate compliance errors altogether because their team might shrink.  But I recently heard an amazing tale of incentives that stunned me.  One supplier compliance manager requires everyone in the compliance department to negotiate away each year the equivalent of their own salary.  These people are now incented to make sure as many supply chain errors as possible occur in order that they can cover their salary each year.  This means never fixing the problems identified via root-cause analysis – if such analysis is even engaged in.  Thus the problems recur so they can negotiate away some of the penalty again and again. 

So much for helping the company meet the corporate goals of stakeholder equity, customer satisfaction and operational efficiency.

This is unique in my experience.  Is it in yours?